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Global imbalances 




Much of the policy debate in coming years will hinge on two questions: have global imbalances contributed 
to the ﬁ  nancial crisis? Is a reduction in global imbalances a prerequisite to ensuring global ﬁ  nancial stability? 
In light of available research and analysis, it is reasonable to argue that common causes likely lay behind 
both the crisis and global imbalances. They include heterogeneous saving preferences, asymmetric 
ﬁ  nancial development across countries engaged in global ﬁ  nancial markets, and the undersupply of liquid 
and safe assets at the aggregate level. Looking ahead, the international community has to strike the right 
balance between, on the one hand, countries’ legitimate sovereignty over monetary, capital account, and 
exchange rate policies and, on the other hand, intensiﬁ  ed interdependencies, the global system’s increased 
complexity, and diverging economic prospects across countries. Rebalancing world demand will no doubt 
be a gradual, long-run process. To help foster an orderly unwinding, all countries need to ensure that their 
policies do not create further distortions in the global economy. Several improvements to the international 
monetary system could be considered to help reduce incentives for distortive policies.
FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   107 FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   107 11/02/2011   09:38:27 11/02/2011   09:38:27Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
108  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011
Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
Christian Noyer
T
wo key questions stand out when examining 
the link between global imbalances and 
ﬁ  nancial stability. The ﬁ  rst relates to the 
link between global imbalances and the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis: have the former contributed to the latter? 
The second is forward-looking in nature: is the 
reduction of global imbalances a prerequisite to 
ensure global ﬁ  nancial stability? Much of the policy 
debate in the coming years will likely hinge on these 
two questions. 
This article starts with a discussion of the links 
between global imbalances and the crisis. Then it 
turns to an assessment of the current conﬁ  guration 
of imbalances, and the risks associated with them. 
Based on this, it tries to evaluate what could be the 
speed and conditions for an orderly rebalancing 
of demand across countries. It ends by exploring 
whether reforms of the international monetary 
system could help.
1| G LOBAL IMBALANCES 
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Whether causality exists between global imbalances 
and the global ﬁ  nancial crisis is subject to active 
research in academia and intense discussions 
between policy makers. 
Some would argue that global imbalances actually 
caused the crisis. Others would rather put the onus 
on domestic factors. This Financial Stability Review 
gathers a large spectrum of views on the subject 
and as such, hopefully, contributes to advancing our 
understanding of the crisis. I would argue that the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis was the symptom of growing fragilities 
in the world economy and that it is reasonable to 
assume that some common causes lay behind both 
the crisis and the imbalances themselves. 
Three patterns in the world ﬁ  nancial system have 
been conducive to persistent global imbalances and 
also unsustainable ﬁ  nancial fragilities. 
First, real domestic imbalances have increased over 
the last decade. A huge increase in productive capacity 
occurred in the emerging world in the years prior 
to the crisis. A shift in the primary share of income 
took place worldwide. For instance, in China, the share 
of wages in gross domestic product (GDP) has declined 
from 55% in 1992 to 48% in 2008; in the United States, 
the median real wage has been stagnant over the 
last ﬁ  fteen years, despite the fact that real GDP has 
grown annually by above 3% over the same period. 
In contrast, consumption trends have been 
widely divergent among countries. China and the 
United States are again good examples. In China, the 
share of consumption has gone down by more than 
10% of GDP over the last decade in relative terms. 
With consumption lagging behind, China and other 
similar countries experienced high savings that had 
to be recycled somewhere. They ended up being 
absorbed by the credit booms that led to the crisis 
in a few advanced countries. In the United States 
especially, consumption kept growing, both in 
absolute terms and as a share of GDP, fuelling demand 
for imports. Households in the United States could 
consume more and save less, despite stagnant wages, 
because they felt richer. And they felt richer because 
the value of their houses and ﬁ  nancial assets was 
rising at a quick pace and that trend was expected to 
persist. Broadly speaking, the worldwide equilibrium 
between demand and supply of goods was based on 
a sustained asset price bubble in the United States. 
Second, ﬁ  nancial development across countries 
and regions has been asymmetric. Whether one 
looks at capital account regimes, the breadth and 
depth of domestic financial markets or, more 
generally, their ability to generate locally a sufﬁ  cient 
supply of safe and liquid assets, countries actively 
participating in the global ﬁ  nancial system are in 
very different situations. Some of these differences 
reﬂ  ect fundamental social choices and preferences. 
They must be respected and indeed accommodated. 
Others, however, result from deliberate or 
inadvertent policy-induced distortions, which should 
be reduced or eliminated. Financial imperfections 
at the domestic level and frictions in international 
capital ﬂ  ows interact with each other to create and 
amplify imbalances. Financial instability is a product 
of such interaction. Part of that ﬁ  nancial instability 
shows up in exchange rates movements.
Third, the international financial system faced 
a shortage of safe assets. This shortage in turn 
provided incentives in the private ﬁ  nancial sector to 
generate apparently safe assets through innovation. 
According to some observers, this is one fundamental 
reason why bubbles have emerged in many countries 
with increasing frequency, either in real estate or 
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ﬁ  nancial markets or both. Only the US economy 
and its ﬁ  nancial system have the ability and skills 
to produce liquid and safe assets in industrial 
quantities. US capital markets act naturally as a 
magnet for world savings, especially ofﬁ  cial foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition, ﬁ  nancial engineering 
and technological advances allowed US ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to manufacture complex products which 
were perceived safe, but proved very fragile. 
2| R EBALANCING THE WORLD ECONOMY
Rebalancing world demand will no doubt be a gradual, 
long-run process. Many features of the pre-crisis 
environment are still with us and will continue to 
be so for some time. Correcting them will hinge 
on far-reaching, progressive changes in domestic 
economies.
In surplus countries, adjustment will likely take time. 
It is a long-run process as many factors stand behind 
the high saving rate of these countries. Importantly, 
some of them, like demographic transformation 
or the underdevelopment of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
systems, are structural in nature. In some countries, 
the development of social safety nets (e.g. public 
health insurance and pension systems, improved 
access to the education system, etc.) along with 
an increase in borrowing opportunities stemming 
from the development of ﬁ  nancial systems might 
help reducing households’ precautionary savings. 
Improved access to credit and to ﬁ  nancial markets 
might similarly contribute to a decrease in corporate 
savings as ﬁ  rms would not need to rely as much on 
retained earnings to ﬁ  nance investment.
As for advanced economies, technical progress 
and pressures from the emerging world as well 
as unemployment may work to constrain wage 
dynamics. Also, a general sense of economic 
insecurity after the crisis will likely induce increases 
in savings for a number of years. In most countries, 
and especially in Europe, there is an urgent need for 
strong ﬁ  scal consolidation. Market discipline will act 
powerfully to impose strong consolidation of public 
ﬁ  nance over an extended period of time.
One essential objective in our international dialogue 
should be to agree on the respective roles of 
structural versus policy-induced factors that underpin 
internal imbalances. This in turn would help us 
to agree on appropriate changes in our domestic 
policies. The Framework for Strong, Sustainable, 
and Balanced Growth is the good place to have this 
dialogue. It should continue to play a central role.
The shared objective of rebalancing aggregate 
demand across the world has underpinned the 
cohesion exhibited by G20 countries during the acute 
phase of the crisis. It played an essential role in 2008 
and 2009 in restoring conﬁ  dence and setting the path 
for the recovery. However, this concerted approach 
to global imbalances may have weakened recently. 
There is clearly an ongoing debate about two major 
and interrelated issues: ﬁ  rst, the appropriate pace 
of rebalancing, with advanced countries feeling a 
greater sense of urgency; and second, on the most 
efﬁ  cient strategies, in particular regarding exchange 
rates.
We have to start from three basic realities. First, 
countries are free to conduct the monetary policies 
they deem appropriate. Indeed, when central banks 
are independent, they are legally obliged to do so. 
Monetary policies are conducted with domestic 
objectives in mind, but all central banks seek to 
achieve price stability. This is true for all countries, 
whether small or large. The world has enormously 
beneﬁ  ted from two decades of price stability resulting 
from monetary regimes based on Central bank 
independence and a focus on internal price stability.
Second, according to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Articles, countries are free to choose 
their capital account and exchange rate regimes 
with the proviso that they do not engage in currency 
manipulation. This is a basic pillar of our current 
system. The proviso has proved very difﬁ  cult to 
deﬁ  ne, let alone to implement. The IMF has met 
with some difﬁ  culties in trying to set up an efﬁ  cient 
and symmetric process of multilateral surveillance. 
Third, the world is one of greater interdependence 
and complexity. International capital ﬂ  ows have 
made countries truly interconnected. The monetary 
and financial system has become “multipolar”. 
An increasing number of countries, both developed 
and emerging, have become active participants in 
the global capital market. Spillovers between national 
monetary and economic policies have multiplied. 
And no country can truly be indifferent to actions
taken by others.
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In current circumstances, those three basic realities 
have become much harder to reconcile.
The responsibility for imbalances cannot be 
ascribed to one speciﬁ  c cause. All countries have 
legitimate concerns. But, we should also recognise 
that rebalancing cannot be achieved without some 
adjustment in relative prices. In market economies, 
it is important that producers can operate in the 
right price environment when they make long-term 
decisions about investing in technology and 
productive capacity. Countries are free –and should 
remain free– to choose whatever exchange rate 
regime and policy suit them best, taking into account 
their speciﬁ  c national circumstances. Real exchange 
rate adjustment, however, is an integral part of 
a global and orderly rebalancing strategy. 
Divergences in monetary policies are unavoidable 
given the uneven paths of recovery across the world. 
And, for each country, this may be a time where price 
and ﬁ  nancial stability objectives may not coincide. 
In advanced economies, monetary easing, together 
with constraints to credit growth, creates a potential 
for further ﬁ  nancial imbalances. In many emerging 
countries, inﬂ  ationary pressures would warrant 
monetary tightening but there is a clear risk that 
this would trigger destabilising capital inﬂ  ows.
In these circumstances, there is a major role to 
play for macroprudential policies. For advanced 
economies, they should aim at spurring credit 
growth, while increasing the resilience of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. Supervisors should also stand ready 
to act if bubble-like phenomena appear in some 
markets. For emerging economies, measures aimed 
at stabilising capital inﬂ  ows may help and relieve 
the pressure on domestic ﬁ  nancial conditions and 
prevent further asset bubbles.
Full harmonisation and total convergence in ﬁ  nancial 
development across different countries is neither 
desirable nor feasible. Still, ﬁ  nancial development 
in emerging economies can go a long way towards 
expanding the range of safe and liquid ﬁ  nancial assets 
available to domestic and international investors. 
Capital markets in local currencies have indeed 
developed signiﬁ  cantly over the last decade as ﬁ  scal 
positions in emerging countries have dramatically 
improved. There seems to be considerable scope 
for regional ﬁ  nancial and monetary arrangements 
to prosper in the future. The huge pools of savings 
currently available can be intermediated locally 
instead of going through ﬁ  nancial systems located 
in advanced economies. Regional ﬁ  nancial markets 
would have to be supplemented and underpinned 
by monetary arrangements. Asian countries are 
working on and implementing progressively such 
schemes through the Chiang Mai initiative.
Ensuring that different ﬁ  nancial systems interact 
harmoniously must be a priority. Greater convergence 
in financial regulation approaches between 
advanced and emerging economies is required. 
Indeed, significant advances are being made. 
The most important emerging countries are now 
full members of the Financial Stability Board and the 
Basel Committee; as such, they participate in steering 
and leading the effort to build a more resilient and 
efﬁ  cient global ﬁ  nancial system. In policy terms, the 
Basel Committee succeeded in a very short span of 
time in strengthening considerably the international 
prudential framework for banks. Implementation of 
Basel III by all countries in a synchronised fashion 
would bring the global ﬁ  nancial system another step 
towards a consistent global regulatory framework. 
3| I SSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The world economy, the global ﬁ  nancial system and 
the international monetary system do not operate 
independently from each other. At a general level, 
there are several options that could help improve 
the functioning of the system.
It is important that countries which decide to open 
their capital markets be adequately protected against 
external ﬁ  nancial shocks. Emerging countries have 
constantly sought to expand their foreign exchange 
reserves from 4 percent of GDP in 1990 to over 
20 percent on average today. Reserves act as a buffer 
against possible abrupt capital outﬂ  ows. They also 
serve to provide liquidity to domestic ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. They are used as a tool for internal 
–as well as external– ﬁ  nancial stability.
The effective supply of liquidity in times of stress and 
safe assets will remain uncertain in the medium run, 
maintaining a powerful incentive for countries to build 
reserves. Still, the need for national reserves could be 
reduced if credible mechanisms exist to provide for 
the supply of ofﬁ  cial liquidity on a multilateral basis. 
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In the longer run, there are two possible avenues 
for progress to make the international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture more efﬁ  cient and stable.
First, we have to find ways of dealing with 
international capital ﬂ  ow volatility. For a given 
country, capital controls may temporarily reduce the 
pressure on its capital account or even permanently 
limit the volatility of its exchange rate. For the whole 
international system, however, they may simply shift 
the pressure to other countries or asset classes and 
exacerbate, rather than reduce, overall volatility. 
There might be ways to eliminate these negative 
effects. Strengthening ﬁ  nancial supervision is one 
option. Another potential way is for countries 
to use so-called macroprudential tools. Indeed, 
calls have been made to develop an emerging 
markets’ perspective on macroprudential policy, 
suggesting that this new approach to financial 
regulation may hold a promise for a better handling 
large capital ﬂ  ows. Several emerging economies have 
also implemented some form of capital controls. 
A predictable framework deﬁ  ning the circumstances, 
conditions and modalities for using temporary capital 
controls would certainly be helpful. From the G20 
perspective, it would be very useful to examine and 
assess in details the full spectrum of such measures 
available to manage capital ﬂ  ows and safeguard 
ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Second, beneﬁ  ts would be derived from ﬁ  nding 
ways to disconnect reserve accumulation from 
exchange rate management and, more generally, 
from balance of payment situations and monetary 
policies. At present, reserve accumulation can 
only occur through a conjunction of a balance of 
payment surplus and some degree of exchange rate 
intervention. Precautionary reserve accumulation, 
however legitimate, unavoidably creates side effects 
for domestic macro policies as well as spillover 
effects on other countries. Stabilising the demand 
for international reserves would therefore bring 
huge beneﬁ  ts in terms of world welfare. The need 
for national reserves could be reduced if credible 
mechanisms existed to provide for the supply of 
ofﬁ  cial liquidity on a multilateral basis. Hence the 
current search for international ﬁ  nancial safety 
nets which became a priority for the G20, under 
the Korean presidency. The idea is to improve the 
set of instruments available to cushion liquidity 
shortages or sudden stops to capital inflows. 
This is an important agenda, which should be 
pursued. Signiﬁ  cant progress has been achieved in 
the recent period with the creation by the IMF of 
new facilities and a new SDR allocation –the biggest 
ever– amounting to the equivalent of USD 250 billion. 
More needs to be done and work should be undertaken 
to ﬁ  nd sources of international liquidity that are a 
true substitute for reserves without creating undue 
and excessive moral hazard.
Finally, the world ﬁ  nancial system needs to identify 
an adequate forum to deal with exchange rate 
developments. Traditionally, this role was played 
by the G7. Over the past three decades, it has acted 
to help and foster a form of “cooperative discipline”, 
based on ﬂ  oating exchange rates, concertation in cases 
of sustained and fundamental misalignments in major 
currencies, and occasionally public interventions. 
We need to think anew about forms of cooperative 
discipline suited to a world economy where some 
countries rise and become major players in the system. 
Addressing this challenge is especially important as 
the current conﬁ  guration does not allow exchange 
rate movements to contribute to the resolution of 
global imbalances. Inevitably, ﬁ  scal and monetary 
policy stances will continue to be tuned to each 
country’s and area’s cyclical conditions. A key policy 
question for us is to ensure that exchange rate 
volatility is addressed through enhanced cooperation 
on structural policies, together with an adequate 
communication of the latter to market participants.
FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   111 FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   111 11/02/2011   09:38:52 11/02/2011   09:38:52Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
112  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011
Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
Christian Noyer
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Caballero (R. J.) (2006) 
“The macroeconomics of asset shortages”, 4th ECB 
Central banking conference, Frankfurt, November.
Caballero (R. J.), Farhi (E.) and Gourinchas (P.-O.) 
(2008a) 
“Financial crash, commodity prices, and global 
imbalances”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
Fall, pp. 1-55.
Caballero (R. J.), Farhi (E.) and Gourinchas (P.-O.) 
(2008b) 
“An equilibrium model of ‘global imbalances’ and 
low interest rates”, American Economic Review, 98:1, 
pp. 358-393.
Caballero (R. J.) and Krishnamurthy (A.) (2009) 
“Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial fragility”, American 
Economic Review, May.
Jeanne (O.) and Rancière (R.) (2006)
”The optimal level of international reserves 
for emerging market countries: formulas and 
applications”,  IMF Working Papers 06/229, 
International Monetary Fund.
Lane (P.) and Shambaugh (J. C.) (2010)
“Financial exchange rates and international currency 
exposures”, American Economic Review, American 
Economic Association, Vol. 100(1), pp. 518-40, March.
Lewis (W. A.) (1954)
“Economic development with unlimited supplies of 
labor”, Manchester School of Economic and Social 
Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 139-91.
Obstfeld (M.), Shambaugh (J. C.) and 
Taylor (A. M.) (2010)
“Financial stability, the trilemma, and 
international reserves”, American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, 
Vol. 2(2), pp. 57-94.
Rajan (R. G.) (2010)
Fault lines: how hidden fractures still threaten the 
world economy, Princeton University Press.
Wei (S.-J.) and Ju (J.) (2010)
“Domestic institutions and the bypass effect of 
ﬁ  nancial globalization”, American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, forthcoming. 
FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   112 FSR15_107_112_NOYER.indd   112 11/02/2011   09:38:53 11/02/2011   09:38:53